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An Enterprise (No-Fault) Liability
Suitable for Judicial Adoption—with
a “Draft Judicial Opinion”
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article we propose that courts recognize an enterprise liability
applicable to persons injured on the premises of supermarkets. In contrast
to strict products liability, victim compensation under our proposal would
not turn on whether the supermarket’s premises could be characterized
as dangerously defective. Instead, the proposed doctrine would impose a
strict enterprise liability for personal injuries arising out of the use of the
supermarket’s premises by entrants on those premises. The resulting doctrine
would avoid the intractable—and litigation producing—defect problem,
while holding down costs—and litigation—by limiting recoverable
damages. Thus the doctrine would achieve, within the common law
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framework, the benefits of third-party no-fault compensation plans, described
by the 1991 American Law Institute Reporters’ Study on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury as a “better blend” of “efficient
compensation, economical administration, and effective [accident]
prevention.”1
Our proposed supermarket enterprise liability is supported by case law
that has shaped contemporary tort law. This case law includes the
decisions adopting and refining the law and policies of strict products
liability, decisions abolishing the contributory negligence rule and
adopting comparative negligence (thereby cutting back on damages),
expansive negligence decisions, and decisions questioning the award of
damages for intangible, nonpecuniary loss. This case law—and its
support for our proposed doctrine—is presented in the “draft judicial
opinion” in Part III of this Article.
We recognize that the policies supporting our proposed supermarket
enterprise liability could support broader enterprise (no-fault) proposals.2
But, as Fleming James recognized a half century ago, proposals for
judicial, as opposed to legislative, adoption fare better if they are less
sweeping, so that they fit within a “process of growth well within the
framework of our common law tradition.”3 We believe that our draft
judicial opinion demonstrates that adoption of a supermarket enterprise
liability meets this criterion. Before presenting that opinion, however,
we turn in Section II to a discussion of that common law tradition—and
the jurisprudential pedigree that is the predicate for the judicial
lawmaking role implicit in our proposal.
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PEDIGREE
The conception of the judicial lawmaking role that supports adoption
by courts of an enterprise (no-fault) liability approach is rooted in the
tradition of the great judges who have shaped, and continue to shape, our
1. 1 AM. LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 35 (1991) [hereinafter 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY]; 2 AM. LAW
INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 534
(1991) [hereinafter 2 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY].
2. VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY:
RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 168–77 (1995); Edmund
Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises—One Step Beyond Rowland and
Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820 (1975); Jeffrey O’Connell, Expanding No-Fault
Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 773 (1973); see also
Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Strict Tort Liability of Landlords: Becker v. IRM
Corp. in Context, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (1986) (discussing Becker v. IRM Corp.
698 P.2d 116, 116 (Cal. 1985) (adopting doctrine of landlord strict tort liability)).
3. Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 924 (1957).
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law: Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice
Roger Traynor, and Judge Richard Posner. Stated most simply, when it
comes to the common law, this conception of the judicial role holds that
it is the job of judges to continually reshape the law in order to meet, in
Holmes’s words, the “felt necessities of the time.”4 As Judge Posner has
succinctly written, an “appellate judge has to decide . . . whether to
apply an old rule unmodified, modify and apply the old rule, or create
and apply a new one.”5 In this process, the goal is making the choices
that will produce “the best results for the future.”6
This conception of the judicial lawmaking role can be traced to Chief
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, who during his thirty year tenure, from
1830 to 1860, shaped the common law—including the tort law—of his
time. Shaw, for example, wrote Brown v. Kendall,7 the cornerstone of
negligence law, and in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp.8
adopted the fellow servant rule and the defense of assumption of the
risk. In these, and in a myriad of other decisions, the essence of Shaw’s
view of the judicial role was that judges should adapt the common law to
the felt needs of American society.
Holmes shared Shaw’s vision of the judicial role and wrote that “the
strength of that great judge lay in [his] accurate appreciation of the
requirements of the community . . . [and in his] understanding of the
grounds of public policy to which all laws must ultimately be referred.”9
Perhaps the most striking articulation of this perspective is found in
Holmes’s The Path of the Law,10 which Judge Posner has called
Holmes’s greatest essay.11 Writing in 1897, the same year that England
enacted its workers’ compensation legislation, Holmes suggested that
courts might reconsider the requirement that employees prove negligence in
cases involving injuries received in the course of their employment. He
wrote that “even now our theory upon this matter is open to
4. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) [hereinafter HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW].
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 248–
49 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS].
6. Id. at 241. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, DEMOCRACY].
7. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
8. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 49 (1842).
9. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 4, at 85.
10. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
[hereinafter Holmes, Path].
11. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at vii.
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reconsideration, although I am not prepared to say how I should decide
if a reconsideration were proposed.”12
Holmes is perhaps most identified with his famous 1906 dissent in
Lochner v. New York13 and his warning against the danger of judicial
“activism.” Lochner-style activism, however, involved constitutional
decisions, with courts cutting back on the power of the legislature. No
such restriction on legislative power occurs when courts adopt, modify,
or revise common law rules. Thus, for Holmes, there was no inconsistency
in calling for deference to the legislature in constitutional decisionmaking
while insisting on a creative role for courts when it came to the common
law. Indeed, he addressed both themes in The Path of the Law.
Nevertheless, by the time Justice Traynor commenced his thirty-year
tenure on the California Supreme Court in 1940, the clear vision of the
creative role of the common law judge held by Shaw and Holmes had
become obscured by the revulsion over Lochner-style activism. Thus
scholars largely ignored Traynor’s 1944 proposal in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. that courts adopt a doctrine of strict products liability.
Moreover, by the 1950s, the “legal process” school of jurisprudence had
become dominant in the academy, and scholars had generalized their
Lochner-inspired concerns over judicial activism (in constitutional law)
to include the common law.14 These scholars insisted that judicial lawmaking
be confined to “reasoned elaboration [from] existing arrangements,”15
that it strive to be “neutral,”16 “nonpolitical,”17 and “noncontroversial.”
Fearing “the specter of runaway social engineering with ill-considered
emphasis on risk-spreading capacity,”18 legal process scholars objected
that “a sharp change in our system of compensation of accidental
injuries, shifting from the present system with its premise of liability
based on fault to a system based on the premise of loss distribution or
insurance, is beyond the sphere of desirable judicial creativity.”19
12. Holmes, Path, supra note 10, at 467.
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional, under the
Due Process Clause, a New York state law limiting work hours in bakeries to sixty per
week and ten per day).
14. Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229,
230–43, 286 (1981) [hereinafter Ursin, Judicial Creativity].
15. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 398 (Tentative ed. 1958).
16. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 17 (1959).
17. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 43–
44 (1969).
18. Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV.
401, 444 (1959).
19. Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV.
463, 508 (1962).
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Applied to the prospect of courts adopting a strict products liability
doctrine, this meant that a “legitimate basis of criticism” exists “when
courts take the bold step toward imposing and justifying strict products
liability without legislative authorization and assistance.”20
Justice Traynor responded to this legal process handwringing in his
extrajudicial writings of the 1950s and 1960s. Building on the
foundation laid by Holmes and Shaw, Traynor urged that “[c]ourts have
a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its touch with
reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions
and new moral values.”21 Indeed, “[t]he real concern [was] not the remote
possibility of too many creative opinions but their continuing scarcity.”22
Moreover, attempts by legal process scholars to invent “magic words”23
to restrict judicial creativity overlooked the reality of “legislative
indifference or legislative sensitivity to political considerations.”24 It was
simply “unrealistic to expect that legislators [would] close their heterogeneous
ranks for the single-minded purpose of making repairs and renewals in
the common law.”25 Thus, according to Traynor, courts have “the major
responsibility for lawmaking in the basic common-law subjects,”26 for
“the recurring formulation of new rules to . . . displace the old,” and for the
“choice of one policy over another.”27
Judge Richard Posner began his academic career just as Justice
Traynor retired from the bench in 1970. Upon appointment to the bench
in 1980, Posner turned his attention to the lawmaking role of courts,
publishing numerous articles and a trilogy of books that appeared in the
1990s.28 Unlike academics of the “post-Legal Process” era who “spun”
20. Richard E. Speidel, The Virginia “Anti-Privity” Statute: Strict Products
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 845 n.103 (1965).
21. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U.
ILL. L.F. 230, 232; see also Ursin, Judicial Creativity, supra note 14, at 243–50 (1981)
(discussing Traynor’s view of judicial lawmaking).
22. Roger J. Traynor, Comment, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW
48, 52 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) [hereinafter Traynor, Comment].
23. Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615,
616 (1961) [hereinafter Traynor, Magic Words].
24. Id. at 618.
25. Id.; see also Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17
CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1968).
26. Traynor, Magic Words, supra note 23, at 618.
27. R. J. Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of Law, 32 SASK.
L. REV. 201, 213 (1967).
28. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER,
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legal process themes to achieve their substantive agendas,29 Posner
placed himself squarely in the Holmesian tradition. For example, he
describes his 1999 book, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,
as “an extended homage to Holmes’s ideas.”30 The goal of the book, he
writes, is to “push the engine a bit farther along.”31
Echoing Holmes’s famous “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience,”32 Posner writes that the judge “can do no better
than to rely on notions of policy, common sense, personal and
professional values, and intuition and opinion, including informed or
crystallized public opinion.”33 In explicitly embracing (and refining)
this Holmesian view of judicial lawmaking, which he calls pragmatic
adjudication, Posner’s main focus is not primarily on the common law.
Nevertheless, he writes that “in this country, common law judges reserve
the right to ‘rewrite’ the common law as they go along.”34 And, in doing
this, the wise judge would be “inclined to start with [the sources that
would guide his policy choices] to decide . . . the approach that would be
best” in a substantive area.35 Moreover, concerns that the creative
common law role of courts might infringe upon legislative prerogatives
(as is the case in constitutional adjudication) are misplaced because
when courts adopt a common law rule, the “legislature can always step
in” to prescribe an alternative rule if it disagrees with the judge-made
law.36 Indeed, in the common law “a heavy burden of legal creativity
falls inescapably on the shoulders of judges” because “American
legislatures . . . are so sluggish when it comes to correcting judicial
mistakes.”37 These words might well have been written by Justice
OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
29. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has insisted—in line with legal process
scholarship—that courts decide cases based on legal principles, not policy. See, e.g.,
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–23 (1967). But his
“principles” often mirror the policies used by courts to justify doctrines such as strict
products liability and market share liability in DES cases. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, In
Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 356 (1997) (justifying market share liability
based on a principle that “when misfortunes happen as an almost inevitable consequence
of some valuable commercial enterprise . . . the loss should . . . be distributed among the
class of those who profit from the enterprise”).
30. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at vii.
31. Id.
32. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 4, at 5.
33. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at viii.
34. Id. at 259.
35. Id. at 246.
36. Id. at 247. An example of such an interaction is the legislative overturning of
the California Supreme Court’s holding that social hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages
to obviously intoxicated persons could be liable to third persons injured by the
intoxicated person. See Neil M. Levy & Edmund Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the
Crossroads, 67 CAL. L. REV. 497, 511 (1979).
37. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at 247.
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Traynor, who, forty years earlier, wrote:
The real concern is not the remote possibility of too many creative opinions but
their continuing scarcity. The growth of the law, far from being unduly
accelerated by judicial boldness, is unduly hampered by a judicial lethargy that
masks itself as judicial dignity with the tacit approval of an equally lethargic
bar. . . . Massive anachronisms endure . . . , their venerability discouraging judges
from voicing the rude possibility that they may have reached retirement age.38

The views of both resonate with the legal historian Willard Hurst’s
description of the great men in law as those who have had an ability “to
express their time or foretell the generation to come. . . . [T]hey saw
better where the times led and took their less imaginative, less flexible,
or less courageous brethren in that direction faster and with a minimum
of waste and suffering.”39
This, then, is the jurisprudential pedigree for the lawmaking role that
is the predicate for the adoption by courts of our proposed supermarket
enterprise liability doctrine. In Section III of this Article, we present a
“draft judicial opinion” that demonstrates “the capacity of the ablest in
the judiciary to improve their creation of . . . tort liability,” by addressing
the “three crushing and intertwined liabilities of tort liability itself . . .
its uncertainties, delays, and transaction costs . . . .”40 Adoption of this
doctrine would serve the “deterrent and compensatory objectives of tort
law”41 by providing a “better blend” of “efficient compensation, economical
administration, and effective [accident] prevention,”42 and thus address
“tort law’s essential shortcomings.”43
We close this section with a reminder to those who remain skeptical
38. Traynor, Comment, supra note 22, at 53.
39. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
17–18 (1950). Judge Posner has written that the “most influential judges . . . change the
law or . . . make new law where there was none before . . . . “ POSNER, DEMOCRACY,
supra note 6, at 85–86. Judge Henry Friendly wrote of Justice Traynor that “no other
judge of his generation matched Traynor’s combination of comprehensive scholarship,
sense for the ‘right’ result, craftsmanship, and versatility.” Henry J. Friendly, Ablest
Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1983). In a similar vein, Judge
Posner has written that Judge Friendly “was the greatest federal appellate judge of his
time—in analytic power, memory, and application perhaps of any time.” Richard A.
Posner, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1986).
40. Jeffrey O’Connell, Commentary: Judges and Real Tort Reform Concerning
Uncertainty, Delays and Transaction Costs, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 497 (1999).
41. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 5, at 254.
42. 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 35; 2 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY,
supra note 1, at 534.
43. O’Connell, supra note 40, at 501.
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that a court might abandon the defect requirement and fault-based
defenses and limit damages—despite possibly finding our proposed
doctrine substantively desirable.44 In this regard, it is instructive to recall
that leading scholars of an earlier generation thought it inconceivable
that courts would adopt doctrines of strict products liability and
comparative negligence virtually on the eve of their adoption. Prosser,
for example, wrote in 1960, the year Henningsen45 was decided, that
judicial adoption of a general doctrine of strict products liability was so
“radical and disruptive” that it might “very possibly be the law of fifty
years ahead.”46 Similarly, Clarence Morris, another leading torts scholar
of the time,47 wrote in 1965 that there was “no substantial likelihood that
any court will act today . . . to [adopt] comparative negligence.”48
Indeed, this seemed so obvious to Morris that he asserted that “lawyers
will not even consider arguing [the] possibility [of judicial adoption of
comparative negligence] to a court.”49 And Prosser concluded in 1971
that there was little likelihood of that occurring50—only to be proven
wrong two years later when the Florida Supreme Court did just that51
and was quickly followed by the California52 and Alaska Supreme
Courts.53
In our view, courts are quite capable of adopting enterprise (no-fault)
liability approaches as a “natural and easy extension” of existing
doctrine.54 They did just that in extending strict products liability from
food to products generally. And the following draft judicial opinion
illustrates how, in a similar manner, courts could adopt a supermarket
enterprise liability doctrine.
44. Scholars who favor legislative compensation plans tend to assume that courts
are “stuck with the administrative apparatus of [traditional] tort law, [including] the rules
of damages,” see STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 36
(1989); 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 29–30, and a requirement of
negligence (or defectiveness). 1 ALI REPORTERS’ STUDY, supra note 1, at 29.
45. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
46. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
47. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 5 n.14 (1987).
48. PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 256 (1965).
49. Id.
50. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 434–35 (4th ed.
1971).
51. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (adopting comparative
negligence).
52. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (holding that “allor-nothing” rule of contributory negligence should be superceded by a system of “pure”
comparative negligence).
53. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975) (replacing the doctrine
of contributory negligence with the principle of comparative negligence).
54. James, supra note 3, at 924.

1218

NOLAN.DOC

8/22/2019 11:45 AM

[VOL. 41: 1211, 2004]

An Enterprise (No-Fault) Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

III. A DRAFT ENTERPRISE (NO-FAULT) LIABILITY “OPINION”55

IN RE SUPERMARKET ENTERPRISE
(NO-FAULT) LIABILITY
In this opinion we consider appeals from two cases. In one case the
plaintiff slipped and fell in defendant’s supermarket on a green bean.
Because the plaintiff was rendered unconscious by her fall and
bystanders focused on the plaintiff’s condition, no one was able to
describe the condition of the green bean. The trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff was unable to prove the length of
time the green bean had been on the floor prior to her injury—and thus
in the trial court’s view was unable to prove the defendant supermarket
had constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the floor.
In the second case plaintiff, a small child, was injured when the
shopping cart, in which he was seated, tipped over, causing him to hit his
head on the floor. The plaintiff claimed that the shopping cart’s
defective design caused it to tip over. His action against defendant
supermarket is based on strict products liability. The trial court
dismissed this claim on the ground that defendant supermarket did not
manufacture, sell, or lease the shopping cart, and thus is outside the
chain of marketing and distribution of the product and not subject to
strict products liability.
In this appeal, plaintiff in the slip and fall case argues that the trial
court’s dismissal of the complaint is inconsistent with this court’s recent
decision in Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 114
Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11, in which we held that a plaintiff need not
establish how long a dangerous condition existed prior to injury in order
to establish constructive notice of the dangerous condition. In Ortega,
we concluded that evidence of the owner’s failure to inspect the
55. This draft opinion is written in the style of a California Supreme Court
opinion, drawing primarily on California case law to illustrate doctrinal and policy
themes. The California Supreme Court has played a pathbreaking role in the
development of tort law for more than four decades. Its decisions have served as the
starting point for courts that have followed—and at times rejected—its lead. Compare
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878–79 (Alaska 1979) (adopting
California’s two-prong defective design test) with Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189,
1194 (Alaska 1992) (rejecting California’s exemption of prescription drugs from scrutiny
under the two-prong defective design test). See also Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, 752 So.
2d 762, 767–68 (La. 1999) (following Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d
207, 213–15 (Cal. 1993)).
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premises within a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an
inference that the condition was on the floor long enough to give the
owner the opportunity to discover and remedy it. With our Ortega
decision we joined the growing number of jurisdictions that have
responded to the unfairness of imposing on accident victims the
sometimes impossible burden of proving how long prior to an injury a
dangerous condition existed.
Our approach in Ortega resembles what has been called the “mode of
operation” rule, under which a supermarket that can reasonably
anticipate that dangerous conditions (such as littered aisles) will
regularly arise must anticipate and must exercise reasonable care to
guard against those dangers (by, for example, frequently inspecting its
aisles). (See, e.g., Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co. (Mo. 1989) 781 S.W.2d
778, 780.) Under the mode of operation rule, the precise time that an
object has been in the aisle is not controlling—and constructive notice
itself need not be established. (Ibid.)
Defendant objects that our Ortega holding and similar approaches
allow juries to impose what would be, in effect, strict liability. A green
bean, for example, might have fallen in the aisle two minutes before
plaintiff slipped on it. Yet if the store only inspected the aisles every
hour and a jury was to conclude that the aisles should have been
inspected every half hour, liability could be imposed even though the
store’s negligence may not have caused the accident. In other words, a
“storekeeper’s failure to inspect the premises does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the dangerous condition existed long enough that he
would have discovered it had he acted reasonably to inspect the
premises.” (Winegar, Comment, Reapportioning the Burden of Uncertainty:
Storekeeper Liability in the Self-Service Slip-and-Fall Case (1994) 41
UCLA L.Rev. 861, 878 (hereafter Winegar, Reapportioning the Burden
of Uncertainty).) Thus commentators have concluded that these rules
sanction “imposing something close to strict liability.” (Schwartz, The
Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law (1992) 26 Ga. L.Rev. 601, 652 (hereafter Schwartz, Modern Tort
Law).) We note that a similar objection was considered in our Ortega
decision. We wrote at the time that “neither . . . social and economic
consequences, nor scholarly criticisms suggest [our Ortega] rule is
unsound or unworkable.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 1211, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11.)
In the shopping cart case, plaintiff points out that it is “hornbook law”
that strict liability applies to business premises that fall within the
“license to use” category of strict products liability. A leading case is
the Court of Appeal decision in Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d
319, 321–322, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420, in which plaintiff was injured when his
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hand was caught in an allegedly defective washing machine at a
laundromat. In holding that the operator was subject to strict products
liability, the court wrote that although defendant “is not engaged in the
distribution of the product, in the same manner as a manufacturer,
retailer or lessor, he does provide the product to the public for use by the
public, and consequently does play more than a random and accidental
role in the overall marketing enterprise of the product in question.” (Id.
at 326, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420.)
In tacitly approving the Garcia holding, our court has characterized
Garcia as holding that the owner of the launderette, “‘in the same
manner as a manufacturer, retailer, or lessor,’ was strictly liable in tort.”
(Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 476, 85 Cal.Rptr.
629, 467 P.2d 229 [citing Garcia v. Halsett, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at p.
326].) Plaintiff asserts that defendant supermarket should likewise be
subject to strict liability, arguing that the use of a shopping cart is like
the use of a washing machine. Defendant supermarket counters that the
laundromat case is distinguishable. In fact, Prosser and Keeton sees it
as “quite different” because the laundromat is “engaged in the very
business of licensing the use of property on their premises and charging
for that use.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) p. 719.)
In these appeals we adopt a supermarket enterprise liability doctrine
that makes it unnecessary for us to pursue the areas of dispute described
above. Under this doctrine, supermarkets are liable (but with damages
limitations) for personal injuries arising out of the use of their premises
by visitors to those premises. The doctrine covers both the slip-and-fall
and shopping cart cases since the injuries in each of those cases arose
out of the use of supermarket premises.
The supermarket enterprise liability rule we adopt derives from the
doctrine and policies of strict products liability. As we will explain, the
doctrinal framework exists for this rule, which is a natural and easy
extension of existing precedent. We take this occasion, however, to
reassess the policies of victim compensation, loss spreading, and
prevention of accidents, upon which strict products liability has been
premised, in light of the scholarly literature that has developed since our
early landmark deployment of these policies. We find many of the
criticisms of these policies to be sound. We conclude, however, that we
should adjust, not abandon, these tort policies. As we will explain, these
policies, when adjusted, support our application of strict liability to
supermarkets, but only in a modified form. Thus we hold that
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supermarkets are subject to a strict enterprise liability for personal
injuries arising out of the use of their premises by visitors to those
premises. Under this doctrine, victim compensation is not dependent on
proof of defect (or negligence), recoverable damages are limited, and
victim-fault defenses are eliminated. As we will explain, each of these
adjustments in doctrine is supported by precedent, as well as policy. Our
supermarket doctrine, better termed supermarket enterprise liability, will
achieve the “better blend” of “efficient compensation, economical
administration, and effective prevention” that is the hallmark of a fair,
balanced tort regime. (See American Law Institute, 1 Reporters’ Study:
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991) p. 35 [hereafter 1 ALI
Reporters’ Study]; American Law Institute, 2 Reporters’ Study:
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991) p. 534 [hereafter 2
ALI Reporters’ Study].) (Our recognition of a supermarket enterprise
liability does not necessarily preclude the retention of a residual cause of
action for what Albert Ehrenzweig called “reprehensible conduct” under
which traditional tort damages would be available. (See Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault (1966) 54 Cal. L.Rev. 1422, 1428 (hereafter
Ehrenzweig, Negligence). See also O’Connell & Robinette, The Role of
Compensation in Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite
Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah (1999) 32 Conn. L.Rev.
137, 150.))
1. The Doctrinal Framework Supporting Supermarket Strict Liability
Beginning with our 1963 Greenman decision, this court has applied
the strict products liability doctrine in situations in which the underlying
policies of loss spreading and accident prevention supported its
application. (See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59
Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897.) Thus we quickly, and
without dissent, endorsed the application of strict liability to
manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, and lessors of products. (See
generally Prosser & Keeton, supra, at p. 719–720.) Describing the
extension to lessors, Prosser and Keeton notes that the “policy
arguments in support of strict liability—accidental prevention, enterprise
risk-shifting capacity and difficulties of proving negligence—have
especial relevance to the rental agency.” (Id. at p. 718.) According to
Prosser and Keeton, it is also “hornbook” law that strict liability applies
to business premises cases that fall within the “license to use” and
“hybrid sales-service” categories of strict products liability. (Id. at pp.
719–720.) Thus strict liability applies to a laundromat when a washing
machine malfunctions, Garcia v. Halsett, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 82
Cal.Rptr. 420, or a beauty parlor when a defective permanent wave
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solution is applied to a patron. (Newmark v. Gimbel’s Inc. (1969), 54
N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697.) It would seem a small step to apply a broader
business premises strict liability to cases that fail to fit precisely into the
“license to use” and “hybrid sales-service” categories. Thus Professor
Stephen Sugarman has asked: “[I]f the roof falls in or a shelf falls over
in a Wal-Mart store, would it not be as appropriate to invoke a concept
of ‘defective premises’ . . . as it is to invoke strict liability against
General Motors for one of its defective Buicks?” (Sugarman, A
Restatement of Torts (1992) 44 Stan. L.Rev. 1163, 1194.) We think that
it would.
The authors of Prosser and Keeton assert that the use of a washing
machine in a laundromat is “quite different” from the use of a shopping
cart in a supermarket because the laundromat is “engaged in the very
business of licensing the use of property on [its] premises and charging
for that use.” (Prosser & Keeton, supra, at p. 719.) Of course,
supermarket patrons also are charged for the use of shopping carts, albeit
indirectly through grocery prices. We are unimpressed by the Prosser
and Keeton distinction, which, if taken seriously, would distinguish
shopping carts in grocery stores from luggage carts at airports (where a
fee is directly charged). Moreover, we note that strict liability has been
imposed in shopping cart cases. (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978)
21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441.)
The Prosser and Keeton authors insist on their distinction because, in
their view, there is “little, if any, difference between using a defective
shopping cart and using a slippery floor.” (Prosser & Keeton, supra, at
p. 719.) We agree, but our conclusion is that strict liability should be
applied to both. Professor Gary Schwartz has noted that “in one line of
[slip and fall] cases that has acquired prominence since the early 1980s,
courts have perceived that self-service retail stores involve a ‘mode of
operation’ that is especially likely to generate litter.” (Schwartz, Modern
Tort Law, supra, at pp. 651–652.) He reported that these cases “can
permissibly be read as imposing something close to strict liability.” (Id.
at p. 652.) Moreover, a 1994 analysis building on Schwartz’s work
suggests that as many as ten jurisdictions had by that date reached
similar results. (Winegar, Reapportioning the Burden, supra, at pp.
888–891.) And as our Ortega decision demonstrates, the number of
jurisdictions adopting similar approaches continues to grow. (Ortega v.
Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th 1200, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11.)
These cases suggest a judicial willingness to impose strict liability in slip
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and fall cases, thus obviating the need for the strained distinctions
required by the Prosser and Keeton analysis. The cases also suggest that
courts might wish to single out self-service retail stores for the
application of strict liability.
As we will explain, in this case we adopt such a doctrine, but limit it
to supermarkets, while also modifying traditional strict liability by
eliminating the defect requirement and fault-based defenses and
modifying damages rules. First, however, we assess the policy bases on
which our rule rests.
2. Reevaluating the Policies of Strict Liability
While the doctrinal framework exists for the application of strict
liability in cases of supermarket accidents, the crucial question is
whether such a strict liability rule would be sound as a matter of social
policy. As noted, the primary policies on which that framework was
built are the compensation of accident victims, spreading losses over
society, and the increased safety incentives that a strict liability rule
would induce.
In recent years, however, each of these policy justifications has been
called into question. It is, therefore, necessary to assess whether the
policy basis for strict liability remains viable.
a. Victim Compensation and Loss Spreading
In recent years tort critics have argued that the prevalence of firstparty insurance has obviated the need for compensation through the tort
system. These critics also assert that tort law is a flawed vehicle for
providing whatever compensation is needed for accident victims who are
uninsured or underinsured.
The 1991 American Law Institute
Reporters’ Study, for example, asserted that the “use of tort law as a
device for expanding insurance protection against disabling injuries
is . . . questionable . . . .” (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 30.)
Contemporary critics of the victim compensation and loss spreading
goals argue that compensation through the tort system is overgenerous
because it includes large awards for pain and suffering, and because the
collateral source rule permits recovery of amounts covered by first-party
insurance. (Id. at p. 29; Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform (1987)
22 Val. U. L.Rev. 1, 15 (hereafter Priest, Tort Law and Its Reform);
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance
(1990) 75 Cornell L.Rev. 313, 361 (hereafter Schwartz, Tort Liability
Insurance).) Moreover, tort awards are based on the size of a victim’s
prior earnings, although everyone, rich and poor alike, pays the same
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price for products and services. Thus, tort liability has a regressive
distributional effect. (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 30; Priest,
Tort Law and Its Reform, supra, at pp. 17–18; Schwartz, Tort Liability
Insurance, supra, at p. 361.)
Critics also argue that tort law is incapable of providing compensation
swiftly and efficiently. Even strict products liability requires that a
product be proven defective, and experience has shown that this
determination may result in a balancing of risks and benefits similar to
negligence law and (especially when combined with determinations of
victim fault and pain and suffering damages) produce litigation and
delay. (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 39.) These realities lead
critics to conclude that the tort system is expensive, inefficient, and
incapable of producing the assurance of prompt compensation that is
implicit in the loss spreading goal.
We believe that these criticisms have merit, but they point not to a
rejection of the loss spreading and victim compensation policies, but to
an adjustment in their application. Specifically, they point to the
elimination of the defect requirement (and fault-based defenses) and to a
limitation on recoverable damages in a strict (enterprise) liability regime.
We note at the outset, however, that the claim that existing first-party
insurance provides sufficient compensation for accident victims (see
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law (1987) 96
Yale L.J. 1521, 1586–1587) is unpersuasive and not supported by
empirical data. The ALI Reporters’ Study found that in 1991 “[a]t least
30 million individuals in this country [were] without insurance for health
care.” (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, p. 156.) By 1999, the figure was
43.4 million, and by the end of 2003 stood at 43.5 million. (See Kilborn,
Uninsured in U.S. Span Many Groups, N.Y. Times (Feb. 26, 1999) p.
A1; Brownstein, Shortsighted States Are Putting Health Care on the
Chopping Block, L.A. Times (Dec. 22, 2003) p. A13.) Moreover, the
Reporters’ Study notes that “another 10 to 20 million [were]
significantly underinsured.” (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 156.)
The Reporters’ Study concludes that “[i]t would be rash . . . to dismiss
out of hand the role that tort damage awards play in providing a form of
health care insurance for the victims of enterprise injuries.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, “an even starker gap [in the social safety net] confronts
people who lose earnings due to injury.” (Id. at p. 44.) With respect to
disability and life insurance, the study reports that “[d]isability
insurance—particularly long-term disability insurance—is not widespread.”
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(Id. at p. 163.) Furthermore, “life insurance . . . probably does not
provide a substantial economic cushion to the families of most
breadwinners upon their death[s].” (Ibid). Thus, the Reporters’ Study
concludes that “compensation paid to the victims of injury . . . from all
sources is far from adequate.” (Ibid.)
We also believe that tort law, specifically the supermarket strict
enterprise liability we are adopting, is an appropriate vehicle to deliver
the compensation that is needed. First, as we will discuss in detail
below, the defect requirement and fault-based defenses should be
discarded in the supermarket enterprise liability doctrine, thus removing
one obstacle to prompt, efficient compensation through the tort system.
The traditional damages award should also be modified in order to
assure prompt compensation, and, as we next discuss, remove the
overgenerous and regressive aspects of tort awards.
We agree with tort critics that the prevalence of first-party insurance
and the regressive distributional effect of tort liability call for a
rethinking of the role of victim compensation and loss spreading in tort
law. In our view, however, an adjustment in the application of these
policies, not their rejection, is the consequence of this rethinking.
The need for victim compensation, for example, does not necessarily
justify the existing tort damages award in an enterprise liability regime
that provides the assurance of victim compensation. In fact, the scholars
whose scholarship provided the foundation for the judicial adoption of
strict products liability linked their proposed strict liability to limitations
on recoverable damages—including the elimination or limitation of
recovery for pain and suffering and an abolition of the traditional
collateral source rule. (See, e.g., James, Damages in Accident Cases
(1956) 41 Cornell L.Q. 582; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956)
§ 25; James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability (1958) 18
La. L.Rev. 293. See generally Ehrenzweig, Negligence, supra, at p.
1423; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance
(1953) 18 Law and Contemp. Probs. 219; Plant, Damages for Pain and
Suffering (1958) 19 Ohio St. L.J. 200.)
Justice Traynor, the architect of this court’s strict liability regime,
dissenting in the 1961 case of Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines (1961) 56
Cal.2d 498, 509, 15 Cal.Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337 (dis. opn. of Traynor,
J.), urged courts to recognize the damages implications of the enterprise
liability theory by limiting the size of damage awards for pain and
suffering. Echoing Professor Jaffe, Traynor wrote that damages for pain
and suffering “become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a
mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution of
losses through insurance and the price of goods or of transportation.”
(Id. at p. 511). Like Jaffe and James, Traynor did not see courts as
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powerless to limit pain and suffering awards. He suggested in Seffert
that, as a general guideline, “ordinarily the part of the verdict attributable
to pain and suffering does not exceed the part attributable to pecuniary
losses.” (Id. at p. 512).
b. Safety Incentives
A decade after our Greenman decision, law and economics scholars,
most notably (now Judge) Richard Posner, cast doubt on the claim that a
strict liability regime creates safety incentives superior to those existing
under negligence law. Prior to Posner’s writing, it had been widely
assumed that strict liability created greater safety incentives because, for
example, a business enterprise “forced to bear all accident costs . . . will
have an incentive to find the optimal accident level for [its] product.”
(Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal
(1972) 24 Stan. L.Rev. 439, 462. See also Baxter & Altree, Legal
Aspects of Airport Noise (1972) 15 J.L. & Econ. 1 [presenting an
economic analysis of the problem of airport noise].)
Posner, however, demonstrated that “[e]conomic theory provides no
basis, in general, for preferring strict liability to negligence, or
negligence to strict liability.” (Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment
(1973) 2 J.L. Studies 205, 221 (hereafter Posner, A Comment).) Thus,
contrary to a decade of thinking, economic analysis failed to establish
any reason to move toward a regime of strict liability rules. (Now
Judge) Guido Calabresi had responded to Posner’s position by arguing
that in practice, as opposed to theory, strict liability would optimize
accident costs. (See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1059.) Posner’s retort was
that Calabresi had established only that the “question whether a general
substitution of strict [liability] for negligence . . . would improve
efficiency [is] at this stage hopelessly conjectural; the question is at
bottom empirical and the empirical work has not been done.” (Posner, A
Comment, supra, at pp. 211–212.)
The theoretical debate continues to this day, with economic analysis
yielding wildly divergent conclusions in the hands of leading law and
economics scholars. For some, the efficiency premise points to absolute
manufacturer liability without a defect requirement. (See generally
Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability (1993) 91 Mich. L.Rev. 683 [discussing strict
liability and negligence standards] (hereafter Croley & Hanson,
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Rescuing the Revolution).) For others, it points to a negligence rule
(See, e.g., 2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at pp. 15–16 [discussing
product design defects]) or even rules more restrictive than negligence.
(Compare Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law
(1989) 10 Cardozo L.Rev. 2193, 2206–2212, and Priest, Tort Law and
Its Reform, supra, at pp. 23–33, with Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the
Revolution, supra, at pp. 727, 370 [stating that Epstein’s “prescription
translates to a proposal that courts should return to . . . a standard
approaching (the Winterbottom rule)” and that “Priest’s arguments
strongly suggest that courts should adopt a mutable, absolute consumer
liability regime . . . .”].)
As Professor Gregory Keating has recently observed, “[e]conomics
supplies us with a complex and indeterminate framework, and it permits
a variety of approaches to any particular problem.” (Keating, The Idea
of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability (1997) 95 Mich. L.Rev.
1266, 1281. See also Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort
Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion (1998) 62 Alb. L.Rev. 667, 694
(1998) [reporting that “no grand consensus about (the efficiency of)
common law tort rules” emerged from the authors’ survey of members
of the American Law and Economics Association].)
Fortunately, in appraising our new doctrine of defect-free strict
liability we do not need to rely on economic theory. The application of
our strict (enterprise) liability rule to supermarkets imposes a liability
regime similar to workers’ compensation plans, which also limit
damages and do not require negligence or a defect as a predicate to
compensation.
While the debate among tort theorists has been over the deterrence
differences between tort doctrines of strict liability and negligence, the
ALI Reporters’ Study points out that workers’ compensation, in addition
to providing “social insurance for guaranteed compensation,” 1 ALI
Reporters’ Study, supra, at page 121, “has been carefully designed to
enhance the battery of incentives trained on employers.” (Id. at p. 122.)
The “expectation is that . . . [the incentives created by workers’
compensation] will, over a period of time, lead to a safer and healthier
workplace.” (Id. at pp. 122–123.) Turning from theory to empirical
studies of the safety effects of workers’ compensation, the study reports
that the “most thorough and sophisticated analysis of this problem”
(Moore & Viscusi, Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks: Wages,
Workers’ Compensation, and Product Liability (1990) pp. 33–36) has
determined that “the existence of [workers’ compensation] at its current
level of benefits has [had] a powerful safety effect, reducing workplace
fatality rates alone by 25 percent from what they would have been if the
system was not in place.” (1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 124.
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See also, Dewees et al., Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking
the Facts Seriously (1996) 353 [relying in part on Moore & Viscusi,
supra, and noting that the operation of workers’ compensation reduces
worker injury rates more than the tort system would].) The Reporters’
Study concludes that these plans have “a powerful safety effect” that
stems “from the fact that . . . compensation is provided through a
liability system that requires a causal connection between an employee’s
injury and a particular employer’s operation.” (1 ALI Reporters’ Study,
supra, at pp. 124–125. See Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort
Law (2d ed. 2002) p. 242.)
The Reporters’ Study concludes that liability systems based on the
workers’ compensation (third-party liability) model—which our new
doctrine is—offer a “better blend,” 1 ALI Reporter’s Study, supra, at p.
35, of “efficient compensation, economical administration, and effective
[accident] prevention.” (2 ALI Reporter’s Study, supra, at p. 534.)
Negligence law may efficiently achieve the injury prevention goal, as
might strict liability, but no one claims that it also gives the promising
blend of “efficient compensation [and] economical administration” that
no-fault provides.
3. Defect, Damages, and Defenses Precedents
Some who agree with the substance of our elimination of the defect
requirement and reformulation of damages law might object that these
reforms are so unprecedented that we should refrain from taking these
steps. In our view, however, each of these reforms is the logical
extension of the case law that has evolved in the decades since
Greenman.
a. Elimination of the Defect Requirement
In contrast to strict products liability, victim compensation under our
supermarket enterprise liability doctrine would not turn on whether an
enterprise’s premises could be characterized as “dangerously defective.”
Instead, the doctrine would impose a strict enterprise liability for
personal injuries arising out of the use of such business premises by
entrants on those premises. The simplest answer to the claim that this
doctrine is an unprecedented change in the law of strict liability is that
the hazardous activity strict liability doctrine, which dates back to
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, already dispenses
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with a defect requirement. And, just as in the case of our doctrine, the
application of this doctrine is largely to premises cases. Dispensing with
a defect requirement is also the logical extension of our treatment over
the years of the defect requirement in products cases—and of the
enterprise liability theory out of which strict products liability grew.
For the first half of this century, the primary focus of enterprise
liability scholars such as Fleming James was on proposals for
automobile compensation plans. Inspired by the enactment of workers’
compensation legislation, these scholars envisioned legislatures meeting
the problem of the automobile accident with a similar solution. (See
Nolan & Ursin, Understanding Enterprise Liability: Rethinking Tort
Reform for the Twenty-First Century (1995) chs. 3–8.) Only after it
became clear in the 1940s that special interests (first insurance
companies, and then trial lawyers) had more influence in the legislative
process than a good idea thought out and articulated by legal scholars,
did enterprise liability scholars turn to the common law—and then only
belatedly to strict products liability. (Id. at chs. 12–14.) Strict products
liability and no-fault compensation plans are thus aspects of a broader
enterprise liability theory, and they were recognized as such by their
proponents. It is significant, therefore, to note that compensation plans
not only dispense with the negligence requirement, but also do not
require defectiveness as a prerequisite for compensation.
When scholars in the 1950s wrote about, and our court in 1963
adopted, the doctrine of strict products liability, the defect requirement
lurked in the background. While it was clear to those scholars and to our
court that the new doctrine was not simply a variation of negligence law,
negligence concepts have, at times, crept into scholarly writings and
judicial opinions. But, as we have repeatedly emphasized, the policies
of strict liability are antithetical to negligence concepts.
The most appropriate point of departure in analyzing the defect issue
is in the writing of the judicial architect of strict products liability—
Justice Traynor. Just as Justice Traynor’s 1944 Escola opinion proved
prophetic with its proposal of strict products liability, Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 461–468, 150 P.2d 436 (conc.
opn. of Traynor, J.), so did his 1965 article, addressing the defect issue,
point us in the direction in which we have now moved. (Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability (1965) 32
Tenn. L.Rev. 363, 375 (hereafter Traynor, Ways and Meanings).)
Shortly after Justice Traynor authored the seminal opinion in
Greenman, supra, 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, which
adopted strict products liability, he addressed the defect issue in that
1965 article. In that article Traynor linked the recently adopted strict
products liability with the “strict liability . . . for industrial injuries
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covered by workmen’s compensation, and for injuries caused by ultrahazardous activities.” (Traynor, Ways and Meanings, supra, at p. 375.)
In that context, he anticipated that the defect requirement might unduly
impede victim compensation. He thus suggested the possibility that
strict liability might be applied to products for which no safer alternative
is available, products “whose norm is danger.” (Id. at p. 368.)
Specifically, Traynor suggested the possibility of imposing strict
liability on prescription drug manufacturers for allergic reactions,
writing that “[t]he inevitable query is whether a manufacturer should
provide for the occasional risk of allergy as a cost of doing business.”
(Id. at p. 369. See also James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and
Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability (1966) 54 Cal. L.Rev.
1550, 1558.) More generally, Traynor advised that “[t]he complications
surrounding the definition of a defect suggest [an] inquiry as to whether
defectiveness is the appropriate touchstone of liability.” (Traynor, Ways
and Meanings, supra, at p. 372.)
This court’s case law over the decades has reflected the tensions
pointed out by Justice Traynor and points to the soundness of his
suggestion that defectiveness is not the proper touchstone of liability. In
our 1969 decision in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p.
475, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229, we held that strict liability applied
in design cases, and, as part of our opinion, explained our holding by
writing that there exists “no rational distinction between design and
manufactur[ing defects], since a product may be equally defective and
dangerous if its design subjects protected persons to unreasonable risk as
if its manufacture does so.” The “unreasonable danger” language was
borrowed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The
problem—not perceived at the time—was that if a product were
considered defective only if found to be unreasonably dangerous, strict
liability would be barely distinguishable from the negligence standard.
Since Pike, this court has repeatedly held that our strict liability
doctrine is intended to be and is more expansive than negligence law.
For example, in our 1972 decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.
(1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, we quickly set
the record straight. In reaffirming that strict liability applied to design
defects, we wrote that the “unreasonably dangerous” language crept into
our jurisprudence without fanfare. (Id. at p. 129.) Because in practice
that requirement “rarely leads to a different conclusion than would have
been reached under laws of negligence,” we wrote that a plaintiff need
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merely prove “that there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the
product and that such defect was a proximate cause of the injuries.” (Id.
at p. 133.)
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr.
225, 573 P.2d 443, decided in 1978, we further refined our approach to
the design defect issue. In doing so we noted Dean Wade’s criticism of
the consumer expectations test—that, at times, a “consumer would not
know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the
product could be made,” id. at page 430 (quoting Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products (1973) 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829)—but
did not, as Dean Wade had suggested, abandon that test. Instead, we
concluded that the consumer expectations test should not be “the
exclusive yardstick for evaluating design defectiveness.” (Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co., supra, at p. 430 [emphasis added].)
Thus, we offered a two-prong test, the first prong of which was the
consumer expectations test: “[A] product may be found defective in
design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner.” (Id. at pp. 432.) We then
recognized an alternative definition of defectiveness: “[A] product may
be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer
expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the product’s
design embodies ‘excess preventable danger,’ or, in other words, if the
jury finds the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs
the benefits of such design.” (Id. at p. 430.)
This balancing test resembled the tests suggested by Deans Wade and
Keeton, since the word “hindsight” suggests that risk of danger should
be measured at the time of trial—not when the product was
manufactured or distributed. We went beyond Keeton and Wade,
however, by holding that “once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design,
the burden should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light
of the relevant factors, that the product is not defective.” (Id. at pp.
431.) Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski (later to become
Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Products Liability), have
written that our “formulation of the prima facie case for defective design
smacks of defect-free liability.” (Henderson & Twerski, Closing the
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without
Defect (1991) 66 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1263, 1292 (hereafter Henderson and
Twerski, American Products).)
Paradoxically, in recent years scholars, including Henderson and
Twerski, have seen a return to a negligence-like standard in design
defect cases, including our cases. (Henderson & Twerski, Stargazing:
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The Future of American Products Liability Law (1991) 66 N.Y.U.
L.Rev. 1332.) Indeed, under the guidance of Henderson and Twerski as
Reporters, the Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability has
adopted a negligence-like standard as its design defect test. (See Rest.
3d Torts, Products Liability (1998) § 2(b).) This standard, however, is
inconsistent with our case law.
In our 1994 case of Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548,
34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298, we were asked by GM and the
Products Liability Advisory Council as amicus curiae to abandon both
Barker’s consumer expectation test and its shifting of the burden of
proof under the excessive preventable danger test—and thus return
products liability to negligence principles. We declined this invitation in
Soule and, thereby, once again affirmed that strict products liability was
intended to be and is more expansive than negligence law. We retained
(while refining) the consumer expectation test and left intact Barker’s
excessive preventable danger test, with its shifting of the burden of
proof.
This review of our products liability decisions demonstrates that over
the years we have sought to develop a body of law that is more
expansive than negligence law, but, because of the defect requirement,
does not impose an absolute liability. This review also demonstrates that
the attempt to achieve this middle ground often results in confusion
between our strict liability doctrine and negligence law. This confusion
(and attendant litigation and expense) is one reason why we are
abandoning the defect requirement in our supermarket enterprise liability
doctrine—in addition to the fundamental policies of victim
compensation, loss spreading, and optimal safety initiatives.
To avoid confusion, however, we wish to reiterate that defectiveness
remains a requirement in the realm of products liability law. Without
exploring whether the policy justifications we have pointed to support
the contention of some torts scholars that at least some products are
suited to a regime of absolute liability, see, e.g., Croley & Hanson,
Rescuing the Revolution, supra, at p. 683, we wish to emphasize
practical and policy reasons why cases governed by our supermarket
enterprise liability doctrine differ fundamentally from products liability
cases—and thus why we are confident of the soundness of our defectfree enterprise liability doctrine.
Professors Henderson and Twerski have asserted that the
“abandonment of the traditional defect requirement . . . is one significant
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step in the evolution of American products liability that our courts will
never take.” (Henderson & Twerski, American Products,, supra, at pp.
1329–1330.) They point to the fact that in many accidents more than
one product is causally involved. This raises the problem of how to
allocate liability among automobile, truck, bicycle, and telephone pole
manufacturers in an accident involving all of these products. (Id. at p.
1280.) Absent a defect requirement, liability would seem to attach to
any product manufacturer whose product is causally related to the injury.
However, in this hypothetical the manufacturers of each product
mentioned are causally related to the injury. If liability is not to be
imposed on all of these (and perhaps other) manufacturers, how does one
single out the appropriate manufacturer? The dilemma raised by
Henderson and Twerski is not a trivial one. Indeed, it applies also to
proposals to extend no-fault insurance to product accidents, as Jeffrey
O’Connell, who has made such proposals, has acknowledged.
(O’Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds of
Accidents: A Proposal (1973) 608 Ins. L.J. 495, 505.)
However, our supermarket enterprise liability doctrine avoids the
multiple product problem. Like workers’ compensation plans and
automobile no-fault liability, it looks to the specified activity or locus of
the accident to allocate defect-free enterprise liability. The owners of a
supermarket (or its insurer), for example, would compensate a person
injured even if several products are causally related to the injury.
Supermarket cases are a more fertile ground for a no-fault enterprise
liability than products cases for another reason. In explaining its
hesitancy to extend no-fault to consumer products (at least outside such
specialized situations as prescription drugs), the ALI Reporters’ Study
warns that there is “a crucial difference between the consumer product
situation and the workplace . . . . In the latter [context], the employer . . .
made liable has ample control over the circumstances giving rise to the
injury and is able to investigate quickly both the causes and effects of
any injuries that occur.” (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 528.) In
the product context, in contrast, once a product has “left the hands of the
manufacturer, the consumer is in control . . . and is unconstrained . . . by
the manufacturer . . . in the risky use . . . of the product.” (Ibid.)
Furthermore, “the manufacturer has no ability to investigate what kinds
or causes of injuries may have occurred until compensation claims are
filed much later.” (Ibid.) Supermarket accidents are suitable for the
application of no-fault principles because, like the employer in the
workplace, the supermarket has “control over the circumstances giving
rise to the injury and is able to investigate quickly both the causes and
effects of any injuries that occur.” (Ibid.)
Thus the logic of the development of strict products liability—including
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its fundamental policies—supports liability without a defect requirement
in our supermarket enterprise liability, an approach taken for more than a
century in hazardous activity strict liability cases.
b. Damages Limitations and Elimination of Victim-Fault Defenses
As we have previously discussed, the policies that justify imposing
strict liability (without a defect requirement) also point to the need to
limit the damages recoverable under that doctrine—as the foundational
enterprise liability scholarship and Justice Traynor’s Seffert opinion
indicated. (Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 509–514,
15 Cal.Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337 (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.).) In the
decades since Seffert, this court has pursued two distinct paths when
deciding damages issues. On the one hand, in routine personal injury
cases, we have given juries wide latitude in determining the size of
awards for pain and suffering, regarding that as a determination of fact
initially within the province of the jury. On the other hand, parallel to
these decisions, a line of precedent has developed in which this court has
restricted recovery in cases of nonpecuniary loss, exercising its
lawmaking function, informed by considerations of policy, similar to
those articulated by Justice Traynor in his Seffert opinion.
In Seffert, Justice Traynor questioned the appropriateness of any
award of pain and suffering damages in a tort system based on
compensation and the distribution of losses through insurance, writing
that damages for pain and suffering “become increasingly anomalous as
emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to
orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or
of transportation. Ultimately such losses are borne by a public free of
fault as part of the price for the benefits of mechanization.” (Id. at p.
511.) Nevertheless, in 1961, Traynor felt that the abolition of pain and
suffering damage awards would be inappropriate for judicial action:
“any change in this regard must await reexamination of the problem by
the Legislature.” (Ibid.)
Despite this disclaimer, Justice Traynor offered a guideline that would
have restricted the size of the award, writing that “ordinarily the part of
the verdict attributable to pain and suffering does not exceed the part
attributable to pecuniary losses.” (Id. at p. 512.) This guideline can be
seen as an attempt to create a synthesis of previous damages reform
proposals by Professors Jaffe, supra at 234 (need for appellate control,
reality of attorney fees), and Plant, supra at 211 (serviceable general
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guideline) that would be suitable for judicial adoption. Traynor
expressly recognized the need to consider the payment of “attorney fees
for which plaintiffs are not otherwise compensated.” (Id. at p. 511.) His
proposal of a general guideline, limiting pain and suffering damages to
the amount of pecuniary loss, assured full plaintiff compensation—after
payment of attorney fees—for economic loss, while giving appellate
courts control over the size of awards. Traynor, along with other
enterprise liability scholars, recognized the need to link damages reforms
with the expansion of liability. He wrote in 1965 that “[o]nly if
reasonably adequate compensation is assured can the law justify”
limitations on pain and suffering damages. (Traynor, Ways and
Meanings, supra, at p. 376.)
In 1977, this court began its development of a line of authority that
questioned awards for intangible, nonpecuniary loss. In Borer v.
American Airlines, Inc. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563
P.2d 858, and Baxter v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 461, 138
Cal.Rptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871, we denied recovery for loss of parent-child
consortium, citing the “strong policy reasons” that argue against
compensation of “intangible, nonpecuniary loss.” (Borer, supra, 19
Cal.3d at p. 447, 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 563 P.2d 858.) Such losses were
seen as “difficult to measure,” and we wrote that they “can never be
compensated” by money damages. (Id. at pp. 447–448.) Moreover, “the
burden of payment . . . must be borne by the public generally in
increased insurance premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced danger that
accrues from the greater number of people who may choose to go
without any insurance.” (Id. at p. 447.)
The Borer holding and rationale suggested that this court might next
examine the propriety of awarding pain and suffering damages. Indeed,
Justice Mosk in his dissent in Borer pointed out that the argument that
loss of consortium is an intangible nonpecuniary loss, which can never
be compensated, is also applicable to pain and suffering. (Id. at p. 454
(dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) He concluded that he was “unable to
reconcile . . . [the] settled principles [regarding pain and suffering] with
the majority’s description of ‘the inadequacy of monetary damages to
make whole the loss suffered.’” (Ibid.)
Our court’s response to this line of argument is intriguing. First we
stated: “[to] avoid misunderstanding, we point out that our decision . . . does
not remotely suggest the rejection of recovery for intangible loss.” (Id.
at p. 447.) Since the Borer rationale clearly does suggest precisely this,
the most that the quoted sentence can mean is that Borer does not hold
that all intangible losses are now disallowed. Immediately after the
quoted language, we then emphasized that “each claim must be judged
on its own merits.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].)
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While Justice Traynor in Seffert had felt that awards of such damages
should be curtailed, he believed that the legislature, not the court, should
consider the substantive merits of the award. Borer invited judicial
consideration of the merits of the award of damages for pain and
suffering.
Five years after Borer, our court in 1982 did rule on the merits of
awarding pain and suffering damages—in the context of recognizing a
new tort cause of action. Employing the Borer policy considerations,
our court in Turpin v. Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337,
643 P.2d 954, held that pain and suffering damages are not recoverable
in a child’s claim for wrongful life, although we held at the same time
that the child may recover for specific items of economic loss, observing
that “a monetary award of general damages . . . cannot in any
meaningful sense compensate the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 237.)
And three years after Turpin, our court approved a dollar limitation on
pain and suffering awards in another discrete substantive area—this time
upholding the constitutionality of the legislative cap on pain and
suffering damages in medical malpractice cases. In our 1985 decision in
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, we upheld provisions of the
Medical Malpractice Recovery Act, including the $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.
(Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 211 Cal.Rptr. 368,
695 P.2d 665.) We rejected the claim that the cap on noneconomic
damages denied due process, and wrote that “the Legislature possesses
broad authority to modify the scope and nature of . . . damages.” (Id. at
p. 157.) We noted that “[t]houghtful jurists [among them, Justice
Traynor whom we quoted] . . . have for some time raised serious
questions as to the wisdom of awarding damages for pain and suffering
in any negligence case.” (Id. at p. 159.) These scholars, we wrote, had
noted “the inherent difficulties in placing a monetary value on such
losses, the fact that money damages are at best only imperfect
compensation for such intangible injuries and that such damages are
generally passed on to, and borne by, innocent consumers.” (Ibid. But
compare Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1,
13, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173, 465 P.2d 61 [noting that policy considerations
counseled against judicial abolition of the collateral source rule, and that
the proposed changes, “if desirable, would be more effectively
accomplished through legislative reform”].)
In our 1989 decision in Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 257
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Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (limiting causes of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress), we characterized our Borer decision as
“one of policy. . . . Crucial to the Borer decision were the intangible
nature of the loss, the inadequacy of monetary damages to make whole
the loss, the difficulty in measuring the damage, and the societal cost of
attempting to compensate the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 665.)
Turpin v. Sortini, supra, 31 Cal.3d 220, 182 Cal.Rptr. 337, 643 P.2d
954, was characterized in Thing as another instance where our court had
“recognized the need to limit recovery of monetary damages for
intangible loss . . . .” (Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 665.)
In limiting damages to economic loss, the court in Turpin had “observed
that ‘a monetary award of general damages . . . cannot in any meaningful
sense compensate the plaintiff.’” (Ibid. [quoting Turpin v. Sortini,
supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 237].) In Thing, we once again utilized the
“policy bases” of Borer—this time to limit the class of plaintiffs who can
recover as bystanders in actions for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. (Id. at p. 665.)
Thus a long line of precedent supports our consideration of the
propriety of pain and suffering awards in the enterprise liability doctrine
we are adopting. Moreover, it bears emphasizing that the damages
limitations of our supermarket enterprise liability, like those in Turpin,
are imposed in the interest of expanding the number of accident victims
who can receive tort compensation, with one major difference: here we
are relieving accident victims of the need to prove negligence or defect.
Thus this damages limitation is supported not only by the reasons
employed in Borer, Turpin, Fein, and Thing, but also by the goal of
providing, in the words of the ALI Reporters’ Study, the “better blend,”
1 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 35, of “efficient compensation,
economical administration, and effective prevention” delivered by
compensation plans. (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 534. See
also Traynor, Ways and Meanings, supra, at p. 376.)
Turpin was not the first case in which we have, for policy reasons,
limited damages while significantly expanding the number of plaintiffs
who could be compensated through the tort system. In abolishing the
defense of contributory negligence, our 1975 decision in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, did
just that by allowing negligent plaintiffs, previously barred from
receiving any damages, to recover an amount reduced by their
comparative negligence. Our Li decision establishing comparative
negligence rules can be seen as a first step in the judicial alteration of
damages law, since our comparative fault rule commands a reduction in
damages (based on plaintiff fault) in some cases. Our supermarket
enterprise liability doctrine affords an opportunity to build on this case
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law and begins the process of damages reform in a discrete doctrinal
area.
The primary purpose of Li was to eliminate a barrier to victim
compensation by abolishing the absolute defense of contributory
negligence. (See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978)
20 Cal.3d 578, 590, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 [retaining joint and
several liability and emphasizing “the practical ability of negligently
injured persons to receive adequate compensation for their injuries.”].)
See also Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., supra, 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr.
380, 575 P.2d 1162 [extending comparative negligence to strict products
liability actions].)
Our adoption of a comparative negligence rule, in place of the
contributory negligence rule, was an intermediate step parallel to our
movement from a negligence rule to a defect-dependent regime of strict
products liability. Today we take the next step by moving to a regime of
supermarket enterprise liability—without a defect requirement and with
no victim fault defenses—while directly limiting damages for intangible
loss. This new doctrine removes needless barriers to the swift, efficient
compensation of accident victims. The early precedent for our
enterprise liability approach, including its elimination of fault-based
defenses, is, of course, workers’ compensation legislation, and the
desirability of eliminating fault-based defenses has long been recognized
by enterprise liability scholars. (See, e.g., James & Dickinson, Accident
Proneness and Accident Law (1950) 63 Harv. L.Rev. 769; O’Connell, A
Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault With
Compensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule
(1979) 1979 U. Ill. L.F. 591 (hereafter O’Connell, A Proposal).) As the
ALI Reporters’ Study has reiterated, “little incentive to take care is lost
when a patient (or worker [or supermarket customer]) is told that even
though he might suffer a painful, perhaps even fatal injury, he or his
surviving dependents will be able to recover compensation for the
losses.” (2 ALI Reporters’ Study, supra, at p. 511.)
4. The Specifics of Supermarket Enterprise (No-Fault) Liability
a. The Limitation to Supermarkets
The rationale supporting supermarket enterprise liability could
arguably support a broader enterprise liability, applicable to business
premises generally. (See Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc. (D.C. Cir.
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1972) 469 F.2d 97, 107 (conc. opn. of Leventhal, J.) [singling out
business premises for special treatment in the context of abandoning
traditional limitations of landowner liability].) Alternatively, a business
premises enterprise liability might be limited to those situations where
the mode of operation rule has been adopted (a category broader than
supermarkets). This category might be defined to include self-service
retail stores where “the proprietor could reasonably anticipate that
hazardous conditions would regularly arise.” (See Chiara v. Fry’s Food
Stores, Inc. (Ariz. 1987) 733 P.2d 283, 285.)
The doctrine we adopt, however, applies to supermarkets, the setting
of the cases on appeal. This category provides a clear boundary for our
doctrine. This is desirable both to avoid extensive litigation over a less clear
boundary, and because supermarkets have characteristics that may not be
shared by other businesses that might be covered by a broader doctrine.
Supermarkets create specific types of hazards and have established
claims reporting and handling procedures that should provide useful data
in our practical determination of specific damages rules (as we discuss
below). The precedent for limiting a new strict (in this case enterprise) liability
rule to a small subset of a broader category of cases is, of course, the
foods products cases, where strict liability was applied prior to our
development of the modern doctrine of strict products liability. (See, e.g.,
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc. (N.Y. 1931) 175 N.E. 105, 106.)
b. Development of Damages Rules
While, as we have discussed, the need, policy bases, and judicial
precedent for damages reforms are clear, we recognize that the specifics
of those reforms are crucial. We also recognize that in deciding those
specifics, we are breaking new ground. Finally, we recognize that a
common theme among leading judges of recent decades is that judges
too often make insufficient systematic inquiry into what Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis called “legislative facts,” and, more importantly,
have failed to employ procedures that could increase their access to such
facts and provide various interested parties with an ability for input in
this process. (See Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory
(1999) xiii; Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
Procedure (1978) 33 U. Miami L.Rev. 21, 38–39; Traynor, The Limits
of Judicial Creativity (1977) 63 Iowa L.Rev. 1, 11–12.)
In this case, therefore, we will appoint a special master to collect data,
hear from interested parties, analyze damages alternatives, and propose a
damages formula consistent with the views expressed in this opinion for
adoption by this court. At this time, we will not spell out the details—
substantive or procedural—of this inquiry, but we will mention some
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relevant considerations. The first is the cost to the supermarkets and
their insurers of the present approach to supermarket accidental injury
and the cost that would be incurred if all negligently injured persons
were, in fact, to receive the damages allowed under current law. Similar
studies of medical accidents have been conducted and are reported in the
ALI’s Reporters’ Study. (See 2 Reporters’ Study, supra, at pp. 491–
492.) Court files and, when available, claims, settlement, and accident
data from supermarket records are among the sources of this information.
In developing a damages approach under which the total cost to
supermarkets and their insurers does not exceed a reasonable total based
on the data collected, pecuniary loss should, of course, be given priority.
In determining the proper measurement of damages under this new
enterprise liability, consideration should be given to the pioneering
efforts by scholars, including Louis Jaffe, Fleming James, Roger
Traynor, and Jeffrey O’Connell, all cited supra, as well as approaches
suggested by the ALI Reporters’ Study. (See 1 ALI Reporters’ Study,
supra, at pp. 218–229.) Also relevant are the issues of attorneys’ fees
and the effect of the level of damages on incentives for victims to bring
claims. (See Bovbjerg & Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory
and Evidence (1998) 67 U.Cin. L.Rev. 53 [discussing Virginia and
Florida no-fault plans for neurologically impaired infants with birthrelated injuries]). See also O’Connell, A Proposal, supra, at p. 333.)
Finally, the development of damages rules should be informed by the
recent enactment, and implementation by the Special Master, of the
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund. (See Rabin, The Quest for
Fairness in Compensating Victims of September 11 (2001) 49 Clev. St.
L.Rev. 573.)
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